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ABSTRACT
After the ‘Arab Spring’ and the second electoral victory of the Islamist party of
Justice and Development in 2016, Moroccan King Mohammed VI had to find
new ways to reduce the uncertainty of transparent elections and, as a result, his
loss of control over the winner of the House of Representatives elections and the
choice of the Head of Government. This profile will analyse a few of the
paradoxical implications of the 2011 constitutional reform and the royal narra-
tive for democratic transition, and how these have impacted the political
practice of the relevant actors. More precisely, the profile will attempt to clarify
the various accommodations by both the King and the political parties, to
contextualize the reform and better understand the persistence of authoritarian
features despite the democratic hybridization of the Moroccan political system.
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The King of Morocco, Mohammed VI, presented the constitutional reform of
July 2011 as ‘a historic and decisive turning point in the process of complet-
ing the construction of the rule of law and democratic institutions’.1 To win
the support of the main Moroccan political parties, the King had to make
two substantial concessions: first, the King would name the head of govern-
ment from within the party with the largest number of members in the
House of Representatives (Article 47) and second, the King would not
dismiss the head of government, who is responsible only to his parliamen-
tary majority (Articles 88 and 89).
This reform and the issue of its scope refer to the debates on the
hybridization of authoritarian political regimes in general and more concre-
tely on the persistence of hybrid regimes (Morlino, 2011). In the wake of the
‘Arab Spring’ of 2011, Stepan, Linz, and Minoves (2014) insisted on the
specificity of monarchical regimes. They proposed a typology that
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distinguishes between three types of regimes: ‘ruling monarchy’, ‘constitu-
tional monarchy’ and ‘parliamentary democratic monarchy’. Based on the
above-mentioned changes, the Moroccan political system would now share
two fundamental features of the ‘constitutional monarchies’ category. In
doing so, after the constitutional reform, King Mohammed VI had to look
for solutions to the following equation: How to respect the transparency of
electoral processes while reducing the uncertainty of their results to govern
with parties and a head of government he could trust? In other words, how
to prevent an electoral victory of the Islamists of the Party of Justice and
Development (PJD) while respecting the letter of the constitution? Until the
protest push of 2011, the King was able to impose a series of measures to
curb the rise of Islamists: he pressed the PJD to curtail its electoral ambi-
tions; he modified the constituencies in a way favourable to his supporters
and, finally, on the eve of the 2009 municipal elections, he approved the
creation of the Party of Authenticity and Modernity (PAM) by his friend and
Minister Delegate to the Ministry of the Interior, Fouad Ali El Himma.
In the context of the ‘Arab Spring’, however, this strategy was no longer
viable. The King had to find new ways to reduce the uncertainty of trans-
parent elections and, as a result, his loss of control over the winner of the
House of Representatives elections and the choice of the head of govern-
ment. Reasoning from the standpoint of this hypothesis, this profile will
demonstrate that the King’s control over the choice of a prime minister and
ministerial appointments was asserted in the name of his own definition of
‘authentic democracy’ and by virtue of his constitutional status as Supreme
Representative of the nation (Article 42) and as mediator between the
institutions (Article 47).
The notion of ‘authentic democracy’ was coined by the King over succes-
sive discourses around the triple obligation for elected officials and adminis-
trative staff of responsibility, competence and accountability. For Mohammed
VI, the legitimacy of a political party obtained through citizen suffrage is
insufficient to justify a call to govern unless it meets a number of conditions
before and after the electoral process. Prior to the electoral process, the
electorate must remove demagogic purveyors of false promises in favour of
candidates who demonstrate competence, credibility and availability to serve
the general interest. Voters, therefore, must decide according to the eco-
nomic and social balance of the candidates. After the elections, the political
parties must work for the general interest, which is to say, they must agree
independently of electoral results to form an efficient government coalition,
appropriate and adapted to the program imposed by royal priorities.
‘Authentic democracy’ ultimately tries to reconcile two contradictory
rationales: the struggle among political parties for democratic access to
positions of responsibility and the accountability of policies whose orienta-
tions are set by the King.
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This profile does not question the validity of the typology of the monarch-
ical regimes that Stepan et al. (2014) propose, but rather, as they suggest, it
attempts to deepen the case studies relating to monarchical regimes. Starting
with the Moroccan case, the objective will be to analyse a few of the para-
doxical implications of the constitutional reform and the royal narrative for
democratic transition and how these have impacted the political practices of
relevant actors. More precisely, the profile will attempt to clarify the various
accommodations by both the King and the political parties, to contextualize
the reform and to better understand the persistence of authoritarian features
despite the democratic hybridization of the Moroccan political system. First,
the profile will demonstrate that both the 2016 results of the elections to the
House of Representatives and the formation of the government which fol-
lowed show the difficulties encountered in reconciling ‘representative
democracy’ and ‘good governance’. It will then describe how this notion of
‘authentic democracy’ was mobilized to legitimate the imposition of
a government more in-line with the wishes of Mohammed VI without depart-
ing from the rules set out in the constitution and how this process led to the
reconfiguration of the leadership of the main political parties.
The PJD’s electoral victory and the conditions of ‘authentic
democracy’
When he arrived at the prime minister’s office in 2011, A. Benkirane consid-
ered that his electoral performance provided a legitimacy that would allow
him to coordinate the action of his coalition government and pursue political
initiatives in accordance with his Islamist, ideological sensibilities while
respecting the royal guidelines. This was not to be. All of the reform initiatives
proposed by PJD ministers encountered strong opposition. In most cases, the
efforts were abandoned. Despite signs of loyalty communicated by the head
of government, Mohammed VI could not bear neither the prime minister’s
popularity nor the prime minister’s criticism of meddling by royal advisers or
ministers accountable only to the King. The High Commissioner for Planning,
the General Confederation of Moroccan Entrepreneurs, the Moroccan Central
Bank and economists published reports which reflected poorly on the gov-
ernment. It was precisely this diagnosis of the PJD’s incompetence with
respect to ensuring the economic and social development of the country
and the execution of the reforms advocated by the King that were used to
justify the meddling of royal advisers. Periodic publicity surrounding the
dissatisfaction of the two heads of the executive power formalized the contra-
diction between the emphasized announcement of the head of government’s
authority and the reality of a King directly implicated in the governance of the
country. The paradox reached a climax on the eve of the October 2016
legislative elections.
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PJD activists responded to this situation in May 2016 by extending the
mandate of Benkirane as party leader and, moreover, by vetting him as the
party’s candidate for prime minister. From that date until the October
elections, the PJD accused the Ministry of Interior of seeking to discredit
the party in favour of parties close to the King. The party was joined in these
accusations of a deep state (tahakkoum) seeking to influence electoral out-
comes by Hamid Chabat, the leader of Istiqlal, the third political force of the
country. In fact, Istiqlal even called for an alliance of the two parties to
prevent the return of authoritarianism.
In this unhealthy pre-electoral context, Mohammed VI implicitly declared
his preferences. He criticized the conflict between the head of government
and those ministers close to him, he faulted the incompetence of the
political class and expressed his lack of confidence in elected officials who,
according to him, undermined the democratic image of the country. He
even summoned those responsible for this situation to remain on the side-
lines of the political sphere. Without naming them, he was talking about
Benkirane and Chabat.
On 7 October 2016, even though the PJD only received 1.6 million votes
out of a possible 15 million votes, his victory upset the Palace. Mohammed
VI acquiesced and appointed Benkirane as head of government. Although
Benkirane had won, his majority was far from absolute. He proposed
a coalition government with Istiqlal, hoping for far greater autonomy than
he had enjoyed in the previous legislature. However, he promptly found
himself facing a coalition of parties led by a friend of the King, Aziz
Akhannouch. This alliance formed a blocking minority in the parliament
and put an end to Benkirane’s ambitions by imposing two conditions: first,
that the four parties of the coalition be incorporated into any future govern-
ment and second, that Istiqlal had to be excluded. In his speech of
6 November, Mohammed VI instructed the party leaders on the formation
of a new government and confirmed that the Akhannouch coalition was
under Palace orders, saying ‘Morocco needs a serious and responsible
government whose program should not so much meet the ambitions of
political parties according to electoral weight as they should cultivate the
skills necessary to respond effectively and harmoniously to the program and
priorities of the country’2 as effectively defined by the King himself.
From that point onwards, Benkirane found himself in a situation where
he was faced with a suicidal choice: either accept the humiliation of an
imposed coalition not accountable to him for his policies or hold his head
high and give up on the formation of a government. After 5 months of
unsuccessful negotiations, the King revoked Benkirane and nominated
instead his rival for the PJD leadership, Saadeddine Othmani. More concilia-
tory in his approach, Othmani had always presented himself as the PJD’s
man of the situation, at times when Islamists and the monarchy experienced
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tensions, as they did, for example, following the terrorist attacks of 2003.
Othmani responded to the King by forming a government in which the PJD
occupied a secondary place despite it being the largest parliamentary group
(125 deputies). On the other hand, the ministers of the National Rally of
Independents (NRI) (37 deputies), along with those of the Constitutional
Union (19 deputies), both members of the King’s coalition, were assigned to
take charge of the government’s economic and development portfolios,
including Agriculture, Fisheries, Rural Development, Commerce and
Industry, Economy, Finance and Tourism, as well as the Ministry of Justice.
Faced with the electoral victory of the PJD, the King was obliged once
again to step in and explain his conditions for accepting the formation of
a government. It was in the name of the criteria characterizing what con-
stituted an ‘authentic democracy’ that he managed the ‘tour de force’ of
honouring the election results and the constitution, while de facto imposing
his choices. The performative scope of the King’s directives was made possi-
ble by constitutional norms and a favourable balance of power. He used his
constitutional prerogatives as ‘Supreme Representative of the nation’ who
ensures the functioning of democracy rule (Article 42), the obligation of
accountability (Article 1 Paragraph 2), pluralism and arbitration of conflicts
between the institutions (Article 47), i.e., between the government and the
parties in parliament. Moreover, he benefited from the electoral system that
leads systematically to coalition governments and, therefore, reduces the
popular appeal of political parties. Finally, Benkirane’s refusal for 5 months
to yield to the Palace’s injunctions highlighted the need for political parties to
promote leaders that enjoy the King’s confidence. Only with such profiles is
Mohammed VI able to ensure, independently of electoral results, the appoint-
ment of a conformist head of government and thus of one who would limit
himself to relaying the King’s policies.
The reconfiguration of the leaderships of the main Moroccan
political parties: PJD, RNI and Istiqlal
Delegates to the PJD congress that took place in December 2017 were faced
with an alternative for the election of the general secretary of the party: they
could either elect the new head of government, Saadeddine Othmani, and
thus show acquiescence to the King’s preferences or they could restore
Benkirane’s leadership, thereby signalling Islamist opposition to
Mohammed VI’s conception of power. Eventually, delegates opted for the
benefits of participating in the government. Ever since, the King has wit-
nessed the division of the party between those who agreed to limit their
role to the management of public policies on one hand, and those who
claimed certain autonomy and vindicated a ‘popular representative democ-
racy’ on the other.
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On the eve of election day of October 2016, the fate of the RNI, a party
created by the brother-in-law of King Hassan II in 1978 as a home for
entrepreneurs and technocrats destined for ministerial appointments, was
uncertain. Having ended up only in fourth place, the party’s secretary
general immediately resigned and Akhannouch was designated as his suc-
cessor. Obviously, this friend of the King and third wealthiest person of the
country, with vested financial interests in many sectors, including hydrocar-
bons, agribusiness and the media, and a former Minister of Agriculture since
2007, was not elected to stay in parliamentary opposition. After the King’s
speech defining ‘authentic democracy’, no one doubted that Akhannouch
had been chosen by the Palace to oversee the implementation of royal
directives during the formation of the new government. Akhannouch clearly
embodies the model of the minister-entrepreneur that Mohammed VI
wishes to promote to revive the country’s economic development. As
Minister of Agriculture he represents the skills and efficiency of a private
manager in the service of the public administration. To his detractors,
however, Akhannouch personifies the collusion between the monarchy
and big business groups in a context of political and economic reforms,
thus representing a sort of crony capitalism. As a businessman co-opted by
the monarchy since the mid-1990s, the services rendered to the monarchy
have caused his fortune to prosper. Also, in parallel with the management of
the Ministry of Agriculture, he undertook to upgrade the party structure to
be ready to win the next elections.
The Istiqlal which had held the Prime Minister’s office from 2007 to 2011
had been swept away by protest movements and the PJD’s electoral victory.
It was Hamid Chabat, who, by taking advantage of his control over the
party’s union and his election as mayor of Fez, became secretary general in
2012 at the expense of the family of former prime minister, Abbas el Fassi.
During his tenure, Chabat showed that he was incapable of defeating the
PJD in a general election. Above all, he was regarded responsible for
repeatedly crossing red lines that thwarted the King: in 2013, he provoked
the exit of the Istiqlal ministers from the government against the will of the
King; in 2016, he questioned the democratic image of the country; and in
December of the same year, he made clumsy statements about the
Moroccan character of Mauritania at a time when Mohammed VI was pre-
paring Morocco’s return to the African Union.
Despite these oddities, he did not feel concerned by the King’s criticism
of accountability and presented himself for re-election at the head of the
party in the fall of 2017. This was not the case of the wealthy regional
leaders of the Sahara and the Souss who understood the royal message and,
therefore, supported the candidature of Nizar Baraka, a member of the El
Fassi family, son-in-law of former prime minister Abbas El Fassi and grand-
son of Allal El Fassi, founder of the Istiqlal party. Moreover, Baraka is
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a competent technocrat, former Minister Delegate for Economic and General
Affairs (2007–2011) and Minister of Economy and Finance (2012–2013), who
enjoys the confidence of the King, proved by the fact that he was desig-
nated immediately as president of the Social Economic and Environmental
Council after the Istiqal ministers exited the government in 2013. Thus, after
Baraka’s victory in October 2017, Istiqlal has reassured the state’s upper
echelon and is again available to assume government responsibilities.
The leadership changes that have been described above were aimed at
ensuring royal control of serious aspirants to positions of leadership in the
government. They were also applied with respect to other political forma-
tions concerned by the royal injunction of accountability.
Other attitudes towards the royal injunctions of accountability
In his throne speech of 31 July 2017, Mohammed VI referred to shortcom-
ings in the implementation of many projects, including those related to the
development of Al-Hoceima, the main city in the Rif region that witnessed
social protests for months. In passing, he criticized the political parties that
failed to take responsibility and preferred to hide behind the King rather
than be accountable to the population. On 8 August, Ilyas El Omari, the
National Secretary of the Party of Authenticity and Modernity (PAM), who
also presides over the Tangier-Tetouan-al-Hoceima region, felt targeted and
resigned. This announcement by the right-hand man of Fouad Ali El Himma,
the King’s close political adviser, confirmed the failure of the PAM, whose
first vocation since its creation in 2009 was to defeat the PJD.
The resignation of the leader of PAM was not followed by leaders of other
political parties. However, on 25 October 2017, after reading the conclusions
of a report of the Court of Auditors that highlighted the delays in launching
development programs in the Rif, the King dismissed four ministers and
secretaries of state, among them, Nabil Ben Abdallah, the Secretary General
of the Party of Progress and Socialism (PPS), and Mohamed Assad, the
former Minister of the Interior, who had joined the Popular Movement
(MP) presumably to become its head at the next party congress to be
held in September 2018. To be able to do this, Mohammed VI invoked
once again the constitutional articles on accountability (Article 1,
Paragraph 2) and his power to dismiss ministers (Article 47). While Assad
renounced his ambition to stand for the presidency of the Popular
Movement, in fact to the surprise of many observers, Nabil Ben Abdallah
ran for the post of secretary general of the PPS and was re-elected for a third
term in May 2018. As he recalled in an interview, he had submitted his
candidacy only because it had received no disavowal from the upper
echelons of the state. Therefore, the case of the PPS confirms the rule that
despite constitutional reform and transparency of electoral competition, the
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King retains, directly or indirectly within the framework of a limited plural-
ism, his power to promote or put an end to political ambitions within
political parties.
Conclusions
In the space of just over 1 year, and despite unfavourable electoral results,
Mohammed VI increased his control over the government and the party
landscape. The political parties placed at the top of their respective organi-
zations personalities with recognized skills, known for their conciliatory
attitudes and good relations with the Palace, while nonconformist and
populist leaders have been dismissed as irresponsible. By acting in accor-
dance with the King’s preferences, these political parties are in a favourable
position to remain in the current government coalition or join future
governments.
The objective in this profile was not to analyse if the Palace imposed or
suggested one or another of the elected actors, or if there were interest
groups within the political formations that anticipated the King’s wishes. It
was rather to demonstrate the scope of the constitutional concessions
made by the Palace and shed light on the terms of expression of the
hybridity of the regime and thus how the authoritarian rationale bypasses
democratic political representation. The analysis shows that Mohammed VI
tried to recover what he conceded in pursuing constitutional reform.
Reform, however, pushed him towards innovation, giving birth, in fact, to
a particular notion called ‘authentic democracy’. This has been all the more
effective as political parties continue to fall short of mobilizing public
interest and, therefore, compete effectively with the popularity of the
King. At the same time, this notion respects the rules of democratic
processes and satisfies ‘international standards’ for neoliberal good gov-
ernance. In practice, however, this formula is at odds with concealing that
the reordering of the Moroccan polity, far from deepening the democrati-
zation process, actually reinforces monarchical authoritarianism in its neo-
patrimonial version and does not put an end to social unrest. Some large
demonstrations have recently occurred in several peripheral regions
(Jerada, Zagora), and since April 2018 an unknown form of protest
appeared in Morocco, i.e., a social media boycott campaign against three
big companies. Because ‘Afriquia’, the petrol station network of the
Akhannouch conglomerate ‘AKWA Group’, is one of those that have
been affected by this successful campaign, it can be considered that this
protest was a mobilization of public opinion against Morocco’s crony
capitalism. After all, it remains to be seen whether this is a precursor of
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